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Labor and Employment Law
by W. Melvin Haas 1117
William M. Clifton lI*"
W. Jonathan Martin II***
and Alyssa K. Peters**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys revisions to the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)' and decisions interpreting Georgia law from June 1, 2013
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1. Attorneys practicing labor and employment law have a multitude of reference
sources for recent developments in federal legislation and case law. See generallyBARBARA
T. LINDEMAN, PAUL GROSSMAN & C. GEOFFREY WEIRICH, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW (Julia Campins, et al. eds., 5th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2014); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw
(John E. Higgins Jr. et al. eds., 6th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2013); Patrick L. Coyle et al., Labor
and Employment, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 64 MERCER L. REV. 965 (2013); Daily Labor
Report, BNA.COM, http://www.bna.com/daily-jabor-report-p5449 (last visited Aug. 27,
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to May 31, 20142 that affect labor and employment relations for Georgia
employers.

II.
A.

RECENT LEGISLATION

Unemployment Benefits

Effective April 24, 2014, a change was implemented regarding
unemployment benefits for workers in the educational field.' House Bill
7144 excludes educational service workers and contractors from
receiving unemployment benefits if they were employed in the prior
year, and there is a contract or a reasonable assurance of returning to
work upon the end of the summer vacation period.' However, if an
individual is denied benefits pursuant to this law, and they are not
offered an opportunity to work at any educational institution, the
individual is entitled to retroactive payment for each week during
unemployment in which a timely claim was applied for but denied.'
This amendment will affect about 60,000 school workers and is expected
to save the state government about $8 million in benefits.7
Additionally, effective October 21, 2013, Georgia employers must
comply with a new rule concerning state unemployment insurance claim
notices.' The rule states that an employer or employer's agent who does
not "timely or adequately" respond to "three (3) individual claims" within
the "current calendar year" will have its account "charged and may not
be relieved of charges, regardless of whether the associated determination to pay benefits is later reversed on appeal or if an overpayment is
established."9 While the rule does provide an exception for an employer

2014). Accordingly, this Article is not intended to cover the latest developments in federal
labor and employment law. Rather, this Article only covers legislative and judicial
developments arising under Georgia state law during the survey period.
2. For an analysis of Georgia labor and employment law during the prior survey period,
see W. Melvin Haas I et al., Labor and Employment Law, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw,
65 MERCER L. REV. 157 (2013).
3. See O.C.G.A. § 34-8-196 (Supp. 2014); see also Georgia General Assembly,
LEGIS.GA.GOV,

www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-USDisplay/2013-2014(HB/714 (last visited

Sept. 4, 2014).
4. Ga. H.R. Bill 714, Reg. Sess. (2014) (codified in relevant part at O.C.GJ.A § 34-8-196).
5. O.C.G.A. § 34-8-196(b)(2).
6. O.C.G.A. § 34-8-196(b)(3).
7. Kristina Torres, Georgia Senate Votes to Bar Some Workers From Unemployment
Benefits, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.ajc.colm/news/news/state-regional-

govt-politics/georgia-senate-votes-to-bar-some-workers-from-unemnfIHcp/.
8. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 300-2-3.05 (2014).
9. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 300-2-3.05(2).
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that can show "substantial good cause," this standard is an onerous
one.1" The practical effect of this rule is that Georgia employers will
have their account with the Georgia Department of Labor charged if
they do not respond timely and adequately (meaning completely) to
every unemployment claim. 1
B.

Georgia's New Gun Laws
Effective July 1, 2014, licensed weapon holders had their right to carry
expanded.12 Before House Bill 601" was passed, the law allowed both
private property owners and "persons in legal control of property"
through a lease or other type of agreement to control access to such
property and to prohibit licensed gun owners from entering with
weapons. 14 Businesses that operate on private property still enjoy the
right to exclude or eject a licensed gun owner who enters private
property carrying a gun.15 However, businesses that are housed in
government buildings will no longer be able to exclude or eject licensed
gun owners from carrying weapons on the property if certain statutory
requirements are met.' 6 The statute authorizes licensed individuals "to
carry a weapon in a government building when the government building
is open for business and where ingress into such building is not
restricted or screened by security personnel."" A government building
is defined as a building in which a government entity" is housed or
meets in its official capacity, or the portion of any building that is not
publicly owned but is occupied by a government entity.19
This statute has yet to be interpreted by the courts. Many essential
terms have not been defined in the statute. For example, the statute is
silent on the definition of the terms "restricted" and "screened." °
Businesses will not know the degree to which they can restrict ingress
to comply with the law until further explanation is provided by either

10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See O.C.GA. § 16-11-127 (Supp. 2014).
13. Ga. H.R. Bill 60, Reg.Sess. (2014) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127).
14. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(c) (2011).
15. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(c) (Supp. 2014).
16. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(e)(1).
17. Id.
18. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(a)(3) defines a "government entity" as "an office, agency,
authority, department, commission, board, body, division, instrumentality, or institution
of the state or any county, municipal corporation, consolidated government, or local board
of education within this state." O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(a)(3).
19. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(a)(2)(A)-(C).
20. See O.C.GA. § 16-11-127(a).
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the legislature or the courts.21 For example, should employers in
government buildings provide metal detectors and have security officers
at every entrance, or would having security personnel at the main
22
entrance suffice? There are no civil penalties for non-compliance;
however, businesses in governmental buildings may be subject to
lawsuits, or other causes of action, for enforcing a ban on guns that
violates the new law.2"
III. WRONGFUL TERMINATION
Employment At Will
"At-will employment" refers to employment that either an employer or
an employee may terminate at any time with or without cause.' While
employment at will in other jurisdictions may be weakening, 25 the
presumption in Georgia remains that all employment is at will unless a
statutory or contractual exception exists. 28 "[Tihis bar to wrongful
discharge claims in the at-will employment context 'is a fundamental27
statutory rule governing employer-employee relations in Georgia."'
Particularly, O.C.G.A. § 34-7-128 provides that "tain indefinite hiring"
is at-will employment.2 9 The definition of an indefinite hiring includes
contract provisions specifying "permanent employment, employment for
life, [and] employment until retirement.""° Further, a contract specifying an annual salary does not create a definite period of employment. 3 '

A.

21. See O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(c).
22. See O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.
23. See generally Georgia Dad Files Lawsuit to Bring Gun to Daughter'sElementary
School, FoxNEws.CoM (Aug. 23,2014), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/08/23/georgia-dadfiles-lawsuit-to-bring-gun-to-daughters-elementary-school/.
24. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 641 (10th ed. 2014).
25. Haas et al., supra note 2, at 161 & n.26 ("[Tihe employment at-will doctrine is
weakening in many jurisdictions." (alteration in original) (quoting W. Melvin Haas III et
al., Labor & Employment Law, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 64 MERCER L. REV. 173, 175
n.14 (2012)).
26. E.g., Wilson v. City of Sardis, 264 Ga. App. 178, 179, 590 S.E.2d 383, 385 (2003)
("In the absence of a contractual or statutory 'for cause' requirement, however, the
employee serves 'at will' and may be discharged at any time for any reason or no reason
27. Reid v. City of Albany, 276 Ga. App. 171, 172, 622 S.E.2d 875, 877 (2005) (quoting
Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 272 Ga. 279, 280, 528 S.E.2d 238, 240 (2000)).
28. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1 (2008).
29. Id.
30. Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 613,250 S.E.2d 442,443-44(1978) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
31. Ikemiya v. Shibamoto Am., Inc., 213 Ga. App. 271, 273,444 S.E.2d 351,353(1994).
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However, if an employment contract does specify a definite period of
employment, any employment beyond that period becomes employment
at will subject to discharge without cause. 2
Regardless of an employer's motives, the general rule in Georgia
allows the discharge of an at-will employee without creating "a cause of
action for wrongful termination. 3 3 Oral promises between an employer
and employee will not modify the relationship between the two; absent
34
a written contract, an employee's status remains at will.
1. Due Process. An employee is only entitled to procedural due
process where the governmental action would impair the employee's
protected interest in life, liberty, or property. 5 "Under Georgia law, a
public employee has a property interest in employment when that
employee can be fired only for cause."36 Given Georgia's strict adherence to the doctrine of employment at will, only employees that have a
contract for employment for a definite time, or have job security through
a statute, will be entitled to procedural due process.37
In City of St. Marys v. Brinko, 5 the Georgia Court of Appeals
reaffirmed that a due process claim has no legal merit when the
employment relationship is at will because there is no legitimate
property interest in the employment.3 9 Janet Brinko was an employee
of the Convention and Visitors Bureau of the City of St. Marys. Brinko
was fired, and the next day she requested a hearing to appeal her
termination. The hearing was ultimately denied. 40 After being denied,

32.

Schuck v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 244 Ga. App. 147, 148, 534 S.E.2d

533, 534 (2000).
33. H&R Block E. Enters., Inc. v. Morris, 606 F.3d 1285, 1294 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Nida v. Echols, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 1998)); Fink v. Dodd, 286 Ga. App.
363,365, 649 S.E.2d 359,362 (2007) ("The employerl with or without cause and regardless
of its motives may discharge the employee without liability." (alteration in original)
(quoting Jellico v. Effmgham Cnty., 221 Ga. App. 252, 253, 471 S.E.2d 36, 37 (1996))).
34. Balmer v. Elan Corp., 278 Ga. 227, 228-29, 599 S.E.2d 158, 161 (2004).
35. City of St. Marys v. Brinko, 324 Ga. App. 417,419, 750 S.E.2d 726,728 (2013) ("A
party is not entitled to procedural due process where the interest which would be impaired
by governmental action does not involve that party's protect[ed] interest in life, liberty, or
property." (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting West v. Dooly County School
Dist., 316 Ga. App. 330, 331, 729 S.E.2d 469, 471 (2012))).
36. Id. at 420, 750 S.E.2d at 728 (quoting Wilson, 264 Ga. App. at 179, 590 S.E.2d at

385).
37. Id.
38. 324 Ga. App. 417, 750 S.E.2d 726 (2013).
39. Id. at 421, 750 S.E.2d at 729.
40. Id. at 418-19, 750 S.E.2d at 727-28.
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Brinko filed suit alleging "that the city had violated her due process
rights by denying her request for a post-termination hearing."4'
Brinko argued that she had job security because she and the city had
42
Georgia law
an oral agreement for a definite term of fifty years.
must be
term
definite
a
for
requires that all contracts for employment
43
statement
her
if
even
Therefore,
written; otherwise they are void.
about an oral agreement for a term of fifty years was true, absent a
written contract, her status would remain at will." Furthermore, her
45
employee manual specifically stated that she was an at-will employee.
As an at-will employee, she did not have a protected property right;
46
thus, her due process claim was denied.
2. Breach of Contract (Other than At-Will Contracts). The
basic rules of contract law apply in creating a valid employment
contract: competency to contract, offer, acceptance, and valid consideration.47 Furthermore, for an employment contract to be valid, the
terms must define the following: the nature and character of the services
to be performed; the place of employment; the time period for which the
employee is to work; and the compensation to be owed to the employee.4" In addition, the enforceability of an employment contract requires
49
sufficient definitiveness in the terms of the contract.
5
In Walker v. City of Homerville," the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Georgia determined that an employee could only
be terminated "for cause," even if the employment contract does not state
5
The Homerville
that the employee could only be fired "for cause."
City Council elected Walker as the chief of police. He was elected on
March 22, 2010, and was terminated on January 4, 2011.52 There was
never a written contract, but Walker was told that if he were elected "he
would serve on a year-to-year basis subject to reappointment by the city
council."5 3 The Homerville City Charter also stated that the chief of

41. Id. at 417, 750 S.E.2d at 727.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 418, 750 S.E.2d at 727.
See Balmer, 278 Ga. at 228-29, 599 S.E.2d at 161.
See City of St. Marys, 324 Ga. App. at 420, 750 S.E.2d at 729.
Id. at 420, 750 S.E.2d at 728-29.
Id. at 421, 750 S.E.2d at 729.
See JAMES W. WIMBERLY, JR., GEORGIA EMPLOYMENT LAw 45 (4th ed. 2008).

48.

Id. at § 1:2.

49. Id.
50. No. 7:12-cv-137, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16094 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2014).
51. Id. at *11-12.
52. Id. at *1-2, *6.
53. Id. at *2.
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police would serve on a year-to-year basis subject to annual approval by
the city council, and required a fair and impartial trial prior to
termination. After he was hired, the mayor and a councilmen disagreed
with Walker regarding citations that he issued. After Walker refused to
dismiss the citations, he was terminated. Walker brought an action
against the city and the council alleging, among other claims, breach of
contract. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that there was no provision stating that Walker could only be fired for
cause and that no oral agreement could require that result in Georgia.54 However, the district court held that even if a contract does not
state an employer can only fire an employee for just cause, the duty of
good faith and fair dealing requires just cause.55 The district court
held, "In Georgia if an employer hires an employee for a definite term,
then the employer must meet its 'duty of good faith and fair dealing in
the performance and completion' of the contract."5 6
3. Whistleblower Act. Under the Georgia Whistleblower Act,57
"[n]o public employer shall retaliate against a public employee for
disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation
to either a supervisor or a government agency ....
To make out a
prima facie case, the plaintiff must prove four elements:
's

(1) [The employer falls under the statute's definition of "public
employer";
(2) [The employee disclosed "a violation of or noncompliance with a
law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor or government agency";
(3) [IThe employee was then discharged, suspended, demoted, or
suffered some other adverse employment decision by the public
employer; and
(4) IThere is some causal relation between (2) and (3).59
In McKnight v. Dougherty County,6" the court held that the protected
"disclosure" by an employee does not have to be a matter that was
previously unknown to a large group of people; rather, the causal-link

54. Id. at *3-7, *11.
55. Id. at *11-12.
56. Id. (quoting Toncee, Inc. v. Thomas, 219 Ga. App. 539, 543, 466 S.E.2d 27, 31
(1995)).
57. Ga. H.R. Bill 642, Reg. Sess. (2012) (codified at O.C.GA. § 45-1-4 (Supp. 2014)); see
also Colon v. Fulton Cnty., 294 Ga. 93, 93, 751 S.E.2d 307, 308 (2013).
58. O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(2).
59. McKnight v. Dougherty Cnty., No. 1:12-cv-13, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41685, at *1,
*8 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2014) (quoting Forrester v. Ga. Dep't of Human Servs., 308 Ga. App.
716, 722, 708 S.E.2d 660, 666 (2011)).
60. No. 1:12-cv-13, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41685 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2014).
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element only requires proof "that the protected activity and the negative
employment action are not completely unrelated."' Dougherty County
hired Xavier McKnight as a procurement specialist on April 25, 2011.
Barbara Engram was McKnight's supervisor, and the two had problems
almost immediately. In July 2011, it became apparent that a car had
been purchased without authorization by the procurement department.
Assistant County Administrator Mike McCoy discovered the unauthorized purchase when talking to a vender. Shortly thereafter, McKnight
also discovered the unauthorized purchase and reported it to McCoy.
Engram entered into McKnight's office and questioned him about his
conversation with McCoy. The very next month Engram fired McKnight,
stating that he should not start fights with people in different departments. McKnight brought suit claiming he was fired for disclosing the
violation to his supervisor.6"
Dougherty County first argued that McKnight did not meet the
disclosure requirement because McCoy discovered the violation prior to
McKnight reporting it.63 The court rejected this argument, explaining
that the statute does not require the disclosure to be previously
unknown, and reasoning that "[sluch a rule would ... thwart the4
legislative purpose of protecting those who disclose public offenses.'
65
However,
Dougherty County also challenged the causation element.
the court reaffirmed that causation could be proved by circumstantial
66
Thus, the court denied the
evidence, including temporal proximity.
67
judgment.
summary
for
motion
county's
IV.

NEGLIGENT HIRING OR RETENTION

Under O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20, 8 "[t]he employer is bound to exercise
ordinary care in the selection of employees and not to retain them after
knowledge of incompetency."69 The Georgia Court of Appeals held that
this statute imposes a duty on the employer to "warn other employees
of dangers incident to employment that 'the employer knows or ought to

61. Id. at

*9-10 (quoting

Pennington v. City of Huntsvile, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th

Cir. 2001)).
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at *2-5.
Id. at *8-9.
Id. at *9-10.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *10-11.
Id. at *13.
O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20 (2008).
Id.
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know but which are unknown to the employee. ' "7 To sustain an action
for negligent hiring, the plaintiff must prove the employer hired an
employee whom "the employer knew or should have known posed a risk
of harm to others where it [was] reasonably foreseeable from the
employee's tendencies or propensities that the employee could cause the
type of harm sustained by the plaintiff."7 Typically, "the determination of whether an employer used ordinary care in hiring an employee
is a jury issue,"72 and is only a question of law "where the evidence is
plain, palpable and undisputable."73
During the survey period, the court of appeals affirmed, in Dougherty
Equipment Co. v. Roper,74 that an employer could not be held liable for
negligent hiring when an employee injures a member of the general
public in an automobile accident unless the employee is acting in the
scope of his employment at the time of the accident. 75 Dougherty hired
Garland as a forklift technician and assigned him a company vehicle.
Although Garland had a fully restored license, it had been previously
suspended because of a DUI. On his way to work in the company
vehicle, Garland caused an accident involving Roper.7"
Roper sued Dougherty, claiming the company was liable for negligent
hiring because it hired Garland with the knowledge that he had a bad
driving record.77 The court held that, absent a special relationship with
Roper, Dougherty could not be held liable unless Garland was "acting
within the scope of his employment and on the business of the master"
at the time the injury occurred.78 Merely traveling to work, even in a
company vehicle, is not acting in the scope of employment. 79
In O'Dell v. Mahoney, 0 the court of appeals affirmed that the causes
of action of negligent hiring and negligent retention do not apply to

70. Tecumseh Prods. Co. v. Rigdon, 250 Ga. App. 739, 740, 552 S.E.2d 910, 912 (2001)
(quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20).
71. Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 277 Ga. 861, 863, 596 S.E.2d 604, 606
(2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Tecumseh, 250 Ga. App. at 741, 552 S.E.2d at 912.
73. Munroe, 277 Ga. at 864, 596 S.E.2d at 607.
74. 327 Ga. App. 434, 757 S.E.2d 885 (2014).
75. Id. at 438, 757 S.E.2d at 889.
76. Id. at 435, 757 S.E.2d at 887-88.
77. Id. at 434, 438, 757 S.E.2d at 887, 889.
78. Id. at 436, 757 S.E.2d at 888 (quoting Hicks v. Heard, 286 Ga. 864, 865, 692 S.E.2d
360, 361 (2010)).
79. Id. at 436-37, 757 S.E.2d at 888 ("When a servant causes an injury to another, the

test to determine if the master is liable is whether or not the servant was at the time of
the injury acting within the scope of his employment and on the business of the master."
(quoting Hicks, 286 Ga. at 865, 692 S.E.2d at 361)).
80. 324 Ga. App. 360, 750 S.E.2d 689 (2013).
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independent contractors."' There, the purchasers of a house sued the
vendors, the listing agent, and the brokerage company for problems with
the septic system and flooding, asserting numerous claims including
negligent hiring and retention."2 The trial court granted summary
judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed.' Nevertheless, employers
should carefully analyze independent-contract status since litigation may
arise in several different contexts and under several different laws.'
Under Georgia law, however, the test for determining the employment
status of individuals is as follows:
[Whether the employer, under the contract, whether oral or written,
has the right to direct the time, the manner, the methods, and the
means of the execution of the work, as contradistinguished from the
right to insist upon the contractor producing results according to the
contract, or whether the contractor in the performance of the work
contracted for is free from any control by the employer of the time,
manner, and method in the performance of the work."
V. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held
vicariously liable for the negligence or intentional torts of employees that
To hold an
are committed within the scope of their employment.'
employer vicariously liable for the torts of an employee, the following
two elements must be established: (1) the employee was acting in
furtherance of the employer's business; and (2) the employee was acting
within the scope of the employer's business.8"
Independent Contractors
In Miller v. City Views at Rosa Burney Park GP,LLC,m the court of
appeals addressed liability in the context of an employer hiring an offduty police officer to perform security functions.8 9 There, an apartment
complex hired an off-duty police officer to patrol the complex. In that

A.

81. Id. at 367, 750 S.E.2d at 695.
82. Id. at 363-64, 750 S.E.2d at 693.
83. Id. at 363, 750 S.E.2d at 692.
84. See, e.g., Timothy M. McConville, Don't Misclassify Workers as Independent
Contractors, NAT. L. REV. (May 20, 2014), httpJ/www.natlawreview.com/article/don-tmisclassify-workers-independent-contractors.
85. Glenn v. Gibbs, 323 Ga. App. 18, 20, 746 S.E.2d 658, 661 (2013).
86. CHARLES R. ADAMS III, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS § 7:2 (2012-2013 ed.).
87. Id.

88. 323 Ga. App. 590, 746 S.E.2d 710 (2013).
89. Id. at 590-91, 746 S.E.2d at 711.

2014]

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

131

role, the police officer shot the plaintiff, who sued.9" The trial court
granted summary judgment, and the court of appeals reversed in part,
finding a jury question as to respondeat superior.9' In doing so, the
court reminded businesses that there is generally no respondeat-superior
liability for the acts of independent contractors; furthermore, "[i]n cases
involving off-duty police officers working for private employers,... the

employer escapes liability if the officer was performing police duties
92
which the employer did not direct when the cause of action arose."
Nevertheless, the court cautioned, "[An officer 'may occupy a dual
position of exercising functions for the public and the company; in which
case, where he is in the discharge of duties for the company, and the tort
is committed under such circumstances as not to justify it, the company
is liable.' 93
The court relied upon testimony that the police officer not only
enforced an ordinance and limited parking in a handicapped spot to
permit holders ("arguably a police function"), but also determined the
resident who the plaintiff was seeing (in furtherance of an apartment
complex policy), and thus the court of appeals concluded that summary
judgment was not appropriate.9'
B.

PersonalTorts
In Carter v. Riggins,95 the court of appeals addressed respondeatsuperior liability for a fight in a restaurant.96 There, a restaurant
patron filed suit against the restaurant's co-owners, asserting vicarious
liability and statutory premises-liability claims in connection with a
physical attack at the restaurant by the co-owner's sons. The superior
court granted summary judgment to the owners, and the patron
appealed. 97 Affirming the result, the court of appeals held vicarious
liability was not proper since the attack carried out by the restaurant coowner's sons was motivated by purely personal reasons rather than in
furtherance of a business purpose.9" in so holding, the court reminded
practitioners that "the employer is not liable under respondeat superior
for an employee's tort committed not in furtherance of the employer's
90. Id. at 591-92, 746 S.E.2d at 712.
91. Id. at 592, 595, 746 S.E.2d at 712-13, 714.
92. Id. at 593, 746 S.E.2d at 713.
93. Id. at 594, 746 S.E.2d at 713 (quoting Pounds v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 142 Ga.
415, 418, 83 S.E. 96, 97 (1914)).
94. Id. at 594, 750 S.E.2d at 713-14.
95. 323 Ga. App. 747, 748 S.E.2d 117 (2013)
96. Id. at 747, 748 S.E.2d at 117.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 750, 748 S.E.2d at 119-20.
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business, but rather for purely personal reasons disconnected from the
[employer's] authorized business." "
In Dougherty Equipment Co. v. Roper, discussed in Part IV,the court
of appeals examined an employer's vicarious liability for a car accident
caused by an employee in an employer-owned vehicle.0 0 Generally,
under Georgia law, when a tort arises out of an employee driving a
company vehicle, there is a presumption that the employee was acting
in the scope of employment. 10 ' However, it is a rebuttable presumption.1" 2 In Dougherty Equipment Co., the presumption was rebutted
because the employee was merely driving to work when the accident
occurred.'
Driving to work, absent any other evidence that the
employee is acting at the direction of the employer, is deemed personal
and not within the scope of employment. 04
VI. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
In the past few years, the law in Georgia regarding restrictive
covenants has undergone major changes. Prior to the constitutional
amendment, courts would only uphold non-compete agreements that
replaced a partial restraint on trade; consequently, any covenants that
placed general restraints on trade were void.' 5 Now, the determining
factor is whether a covenant restricts future employment in a reasonable
manner.'6 The court of appeals has also recognized that the new
amendment does not apply to restrictive covenants that predate the
amendment and will not allow the courts to blue pencil pre-2011
restrictive covenants. 10
For these prior covenants, a non-compete
agreement is valid as a partial restraint on trade only when the

99. Id. at 750, 748 S.E.2d at 120 (alteration in original) (quoting Piedmont Hosp., Inc.
v. Palladino, 276 Ga. 612, 612, 580 S.E.2d 215, 216 (2003)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
100. Dougherty Equip. Co., 372 Ga. App. at 434, 757 S.E.2d 887.
101. Id. at 436, 757 S.E.2d at 888.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 436-37, 757 S.E.2d at 888.
104. Id. at 437, 757 S.E.2d at 889.
105. See O.C.GA. § 13-8-2(a) (2010 & Supp. 2014).
106. GA. CONST.art. I, § 6, para. 5(cX3); see also O.C.G.A. § 13-8-50 (2010 & Supp.
2012). For a more in-depth legislative and political history of the restrictive-covenant
constitutional amendment, see Haas et al., supra note 2, at 171-74.
107. Cox v. Altus Healthcare & Hospice, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 28, 30-31, 706 S.E.2d 660,
663-64 (2011); Lapolla Indus. Inc. v. Hess, 325 Ga. App. 256, 265-66, 750 S.E.2d 467, 47576 (2013).
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agreement is specific and reasonable in regard to duration, territorial
coverage, and the scope of activities prohibited. 1 8
VII.

CONCLUSION

The dynamic relationship between the employer and the employee is
constantly changing with every new law and legal proceeding. The
complexities of employment law continue to rise as federal law and
Georgia law continue to overlap each year. Regardless of whether a
practitioner specializes in state, federal, administrative, or other
pertinent areas of labor and employment law, it is important to stay
fluent in the ever-changing trends, policies, cases, and state and federal
guidelines that affect labor and employment law.

108. Cox, 308 Ga. App. at 31, 706 S.E.2d at 664; see also W.R. Grace & Co., Dearborn
Div. v. Mouyal, 262 Ga. 464, 465, 422 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1992).

